Constitutional Amendments in India: Patterns and Classification
How India's Supreme Court has shaped amendment patterns classification, moving from Shankari Prasad to the basic structure doctrine and the NJAC case.
At a glance
The classification of how Article 368 amendments have been shaped, limited, and reviewed by the Supreme Court over time.
Article 368 grants Parliament the power to amend the Constitution and lays down the amendment procedure.
Kesavananda Bharati (1973) propounded the basic structure doctrine, limiting Parliament's amending power.
It explains why no constitutional amendment in India is immune from judicial review if it alters the basic structure.
Timeline
Amendment patterns classification in India's constitutional law describes how the power to amend the Constitution under Article 368 has been interpreted, tested, and progressively narrowed by the Supreme Court — moving from an almost unlimited legislative tool towards one bounded by the basic structure doctrine and open to judicial review.
Article 368 and the Amending Power
Article 368 gives Parliament the authority to amend the Constitution and lays down the procedure for doing so. For decades after 1950, a central question was whether this amending power was itself subject to the same limits that apply to ordinary legislation — in particular, Article 13(2), which bars the State from making any law that takes away or abridges Fundamental Rights. How the courts answered this question, case by case, produced the recognisable patterns by which constitutional amendments in India are now classified and reviewed.
From Unlimited Power to Judicial Review
The starting point was Shankari Prasad v. Union of India (1951), where the Supreme Court held that Parliament's power to amend under Article 368 extended to the Fundamental Rights, and that a constitutional amendment act was not "law" within the meaning of Article 13(2). This effectively separated ordinary legislative power from constituent power, treating the latter as immune from the fundamental-rights bar.
This position did not survive. In Golak Nath v. State of Punjab (1967), the Supreme Court used its power of judicial review to examine constitutional amendments directly, reversing course and holding that amendments touching Fundamental Rights could be scrutinised by the courts. This marked the beginning of the Court asserting a supervisory role over the amending process itself, and is counted alongside the Bank Nationalisation case (1970) and the Privy Purses Abolition case (1970) as part of the same trajectory of judicial review over amendments.
The doctrine matured with the Kesavananda Bharati case (1973). On 24 April 1973, the basic structure doctrine was propounded — the principle that, while Parliament may amend virtually any part of the Constitution, it cannot alter or destroy features regarded as part of its "basic structure."
This doctrine was tested again in Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980). The 42nd Amendment had inserted clauses (4) and (5) into Article 368, asserting that no constitutional amendment could be questioned in any court on any ground. The Supreme Court struck down these clauses as unconstitutional, holding that they destroyed the basic structure by removing limits on the amending power and by removing judicial review itself. The judgment confirmed that a limited amending power, judicial review, and the balance between Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy are all basic features that Parliament cannot amend away.
Classifying Judicial Review of Amendments
Writing on this subject, Justice Syed Shah Mohamed Quadri classified judicial review in India into three categories: review of constitutional amendments, review of legislation passed by Parliament and State Legislatures (including subordinate legislation), and review of administrative action by Union, State, and other authorities. Constitutional amendments thus form a distinct category of judicial review, separate from ordinary statutes and executive action, because they touch the framework instrument itself rather than laws made under it.
Two Directions: Amendments That Respond to Courts, and Amendments the Courts Undo
Constitutional amendments in India can broadly be read along two patterns. One consists of amendments enacted to respond to judicial interpretation. The 1st Amendment Act, 1951 is the clearest example: it followed a set of early Supreme Court rulings — Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras (1950), Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi (1950), and State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (1951) — and altered constitutional provisions in response to the positions those judgments had taken.
The opposite pattern consists of amendments that are themselves struck down by the courts for breaching the basic structure or other constitutional limits.
| Amendment | What It Did | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| 42nd Amendment Act, 1976 (clauses 4–5 of Article 368) | Sought to place all constitutional amendments beyond judicial review | Declared unconstitutional in Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980) |
| 99th Amendment Act, 2014 (with the NJAC Act, 2014) | Created the National Judicial Appointments Commission for appointing Supreme Court and High Court judges | Declared unconstitutional in 2015 by a five-judge bench, which held it violated judicial independence and separation of powers |
| 97th Amendment Act, 2011 | Inserted provisions relating to cooperative societies | Declared unconstitutional in part in Union of India v. Rajendra N. Shah (2021) |
Following the 2015 judgment, the Court reaffirmed that appointments of Supreme Court judges must be made on the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India, as required under Article 124, restoring the collegium-based process that the NJAC had sought to replace.
Why the Classification Matters
Sorting amendments by these patterns — those responding to judicial rulings, and those subsequently invalidated by courts — helps explain why Article 368, despite giving Parliament wide amending power, has never functioned as an unlimited constituent power in practice. Every amendment remains open to challenge if it is claimed to alter the basic structure, and it is this recurring scrutiny that has produced the layered case law running from Shankari Prasad through to the NJAC and 97th Amendment judgments.
UPSC Relevance
Prelims
- Know the sequence: Shankari Prasad (1951) → Golak Nath (1967) → Kesavananda Bharati (1973, basic structure doctrine) → Minerva Mills (1980).
- Remember which amendments were judicially struck down: the 42nd Amendment (Article 368 clauses 4–5), the 99th Amendment (NJAC), and the 97th Amendment (in part).
- Note Article 368 (amending power), Article 13(2) (fundamental rights bar), Article 124 (judicial appointments), and Article 31B (Ninth Schedule) in this context.
Mains
- Discuss how the basic structure doctrine has shaped the classification and limits of Parliament's constituent power (GS2).
- Analyse the relationship between judicial review and constitutional amendments, using the NJAC judgment as a case study in separation of powers.
FAQ
Q1. What is the basic structure doctrine? It is the judicially evolved principle, propounded in the Kesavananda Bharati case (1973), that Parliament's power to amend the Constitution under Article 368 does not extend to altering or destroying its basic features.
Q2. Can Parliament amend the Fundamental Rights? Yes, but not in a manner that violates the basic structure. Shankari Prasad (1951) initially held such amendments immune from Article 13(2) scrutiny; Golak Nath (1967) reversed this, and the position was later refined by the basic structure doctrine.
Q3. Why was the 99th Amendment struck down? Because the National Judicial Appointments Commission it created was held by a five-judge Supreme Court bench in 2015 to violate the independence of the judiciary and separation of powers, both regarded as basic features of the Constitution.
Q4. What triggered the 1st Amendment Act, 1951? Early Supreme Court judgments — including Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi, and State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan — interpreted Fundamental Rights in ways that Parliament sought to address through the 1st Amendment.
Q5. How many categories of judicial review exist in India, according to Justice Quadri's classification? Three: judicial review of constitutional amendments, of legislation (Parliamentary, State, and subordinate), and of administrative action.
Quick Revision
- Article 368 — Parliament's amending power and procedure.
- Shankari Prasad (1951) — amendments held immune from Article 13(2).
- Golak Nath (1967) — reversed Shankari Prasad; applied judicial review to amendments.
- Kesavananda Bharati (1973) — basic structure doctrine propounded on 24 April 1973.
- Minerva Mills (1980) — struck down the unlimited amending power inserted by the 42nd Amendment.
- NJAC case (2015) — 99th Amendment and NJAC Act, 2014 declared unconstitutional.
- Union of India v. Rajendra N. Shah (2021) — 97th Amendment struck down in part.
- Justice Quadri's classification — three categories of judicial review, including review of amendments.
Sources
- The Constitution of India — Article 368 — Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India.
- Supreme Court of India — Judgments — official Supreme Court records.
- India Code — Central Acts including Constitutional Amendments — Government of India legislative repository.
Further Reference
For deeper reading on this topic and the wider polity syllabus, these standard works are recommended:
- M. Laxmikanth, Indian Polity (McGraw Hill) — the standard UPSC handbook.
- D.D. Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India (LexisNexis) — authoritative constitutional-law treatment.
- The Constitution of India — Bare Act — the official text.
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Constitutional provisions
Empowers Parliament to amend the Constitution and lays down the amendment procedure.
Bars the State from making laws abridging Fundamental Rights; central to the Shankari Prasad-Golak Nath dispute over whether amendments count as 'law'.
Provides for appointment of Supreme Court judges; central to the NJAC case.
Shields laws placed in the Ninth Schedule from certain fundamental rights challenges, subject to the basic structure doctrine.
