Shankari Prasad and Golaknath Cases: Early Battles Over Amending Power

Amending power cases decided by the Supreme Court between 1951 and 1967 — Shankari Prasad, Sajjan Singh, and I.C. Golak Nath — form the opening round of a decades-long contest over how far Parliament could go while amending the Constitution under Article 368. At the centre of every one of these disputes lay a single question: could a constitutional amendment take away or narrow a Fundamental Right without being struck down under Article 13?

Why the Question Arose

Article 13(2) bars the State from making any "law" that takes away or abridges the Fundamental Rights in Part III; any such law is void to that extent. Article 368, separately, gives Parliament the power to amend the Constitution. When the First Amendment Act, 1951 inserted Articles 31A and 31B to protect land-reform legislation and curtailed the right to property, it was challenged on the ground that it violated Fundamental Rights and was therefore void under Article 13(2). The dispute turned on a single interpretive question: does a constitutional amendment count as "law" for the purposes of Article 13?

Shankari Prasad v. Union of India (1951)

In Shankari Prasad v. Union of India, the Supreme Court upheld the First Amendment Act, 1951. It read the word "law" in Article 13 as covering only ordinary legislative law, not a constituent law made under Article 368. On this reasoning, Parliament's amending power extended to the Fundamental Rights themselves, and an amendment abridging a Fundamental Right could not be void under Article 13(2). This let Parliament amend Part III without constraint, at least for the time being.

Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1964)

Thirteen years later, in Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, the Court was asked to revisit the question and reaffirmed the Shankari Prasad position: a constitutional amendment passed under Article 368 was not "law" within the meaning of Article 13, so Parliament could still amend Fundamental Rights without attracting Article 13(2). For a while, the matter looked settled.

I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab (1967)

The settlement did not last. In I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, the constitutional validity of the Seventeenth Amendment Act, 1964 — which placed several state land-reform laws in the Ninth Schedule — was challenged. This time, the Supreme Court reversed its own earlier stand in Shankari Prasad and Sajjan Singh. It held that Fundamental Rights occupied a "transcendental and immutable" position, so Parliament could not abridge or take away any of them under Article 368. It went further and held that a constitutional amendment act is itself "law" within the meaning of Article 13, and would therefore be void if it violated a Fundamental Right.

The Doctrine of Prospective Overruling

Applying the Golak Nath ruling retrospectively would have thrown open every amendment enacted since 1951, including the ones large tracts of land-reform legislation already rested on. To avoid this, the Supreme Court borrowed an American doctrine and applied it in India for the first time: prospective overruling. Under this doctrine, a court overrules an earlier precedent only from a future date, leaving past transactions undisturbed. Applying it, the Golak Nath bench declared that the First Amendment Act (1951), the Fourth Amendment Act (1955), and the Seventeenth Amendment Act (1964) would continue to remain valid, while Parliament would have no power, from the date of the judgment onward, to amend Part III so as to abridge or take away Fundamental Rights. The Court also laid down conditions for invoking the doctrine: it could be used only in matters arising under the Constitution, only by the Supreme Court, and the extent of its future-only operation was left to the Court's own discretion.

Parliament's Response: The 24th Amendment

Golak Nath effectively froze Parliament's power to touch Part III. Parliament responded with the 24th Amendment Act, 1971, which amended both Article 13 and Article 368. It declared that Parliament could abridge or take away any Fundamental Right in exercise of its constituent power under Article 368, and that such a constitutional amendment would not be treated as "law" for the purposes of Article 13. This set up the next round of the contest, which the Supreme Court resolved in the Kesavananda Bharati case (1973) by upholding the 24th Amendment while carving out the basic structure doctrine as a fresh limit on the amending power.

How the Three Verdicts Compared

UPSC Relevance

Prelims

• Shankari Prasad (1951) upheld the First Amendment; Golak Nath (1967) reversed the Shankari Prasad/Sajjan Singh line.
• Golak Nath introduced the doctrine of prospective overruling in India for the first time.
• The 24th Amendment Act, 1971 was Parliament's direct response to the Golak Nath ruling.

Mains

• Trace the evolution of the debate on Parliament's amending power from Shankari Prasad to Kesavananda Bharati, and explain why the doctrine of prospective overruling was necessary in Golak Nath.
• Examine how the tension between Article 13 and Article 368 shaped the relationship between Fundamental Rights and the amending power before the basic structure doctrine emerged.

FAQ

Q1. What did the Shankari Prasad case decide? It held that Parliament's power to amend the Constitution under Article 368 includes the power to amend Fundamental Rights, and that a constitutional amendment is not "law" under Article 13, so it cannot be void under Article 13(2).

Q2. What changed in the Golak Nath case? The Supreme Court reversed its earlier position and held that a constitutional amendment is "law" under Article 13, so an amendment abridging Fundamental Rights would be void — meaning Parliament could no longer touch Part III through Article 368.

Q3. What is the doctrine of prospective overruling, and why was it used in Golak Nath? It is a doctrine under which a court's new ruling applies only from a future date, not retrospectively. The Supreme Court used it in Golak Nath so its reversal would not invalidate the First, Fourth, and Seventeenth Amendment Acts, which had already been acted upon.

Q4. How did Parliament respond to the Golak Nath judgment? By enacting the 24th Amendment Act, 1971, which amended Articles 13 and 368 to expressly state that Parliament could abridge or take away Fundamental Rights through a constitutional amendment, and that such an amendment would not be "law" under Article 13.

Q5. Was the Golak Nath ruling permanent? No. It was overruled in 1973 by the Kesavananda Bharati case, which upheld the 24th Amendment but introduced the basic structure doctrine as a new limit on the amending power.

Quick Revision

• Shankari Prasad (1951): amendment ≠ "law" under Article 13; Parliament can amend Fundamental Rights.
• Sajjan Singh (1964): reaffirmed Shankari Prasad.
• Golak Nath (1967): amendment = "law" under Article 13; Parliament cannot amend Fundamental Rights.
• Golak Nath applied prospective overruling — a first for India — to protect past amendments.
• Parliament's reply to Golak Nath: the 24th Amendment Act, 1971.
• Golak Nath itself was overruled by Kesavananda Bharati (1973).

Sources

• The Constitution of India — https://legislative.gov.in/constitution-of-india
• Supreme Court of India, official judgments portal — https://main.sci.gov.in

Further Reference

For deeper reading on this topic and the wider polity syllabus, these standard works are recommended:

• M. Laxmikanth, Indian Polity (McGraw Hill) — the standard UPSC handbook.
• D.D. Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India (LexisNexis) — authoritative constitutional-law treatment.
• The Constitution of India — Bare Act — the official text.

Disclosure: As an Amazon Associate, UPSC.wiki earns from qualifying purchases — at no extra cost to you.