PolityUPSC

Shankari Prasad Case (1951)

By Abishek A 24 September 2026 6 min read 0 views
Overview

How Shankari Prasad v. Union of India (1951) first ruled that Parliament's constituent power lets it amend Fundamental Rights without falling foul of Article 13.

At a glance

What it is

The first Supreme Court case (1951) on whether Parliament can amend Fundamental Rights and whether such amendments count as 'law' under Article 13.

Landmark case

Shankari Prasad v. Union of India (1951) — amendment held not to be 'law' under Article 13(2).

Key provision

Article 13(2) bars the State from making laws that abridge Fundamental Rights; the Court held this does not cover constitutional amendments.

Why it matters

Established the founding distinction between Parliament's constituent power and its ordinary legislative power.

Timeline

1951
First Amendment Act
Curtailed the right to property; challenged in Shankari Prasad
1951
Shankari Prasad judgment
Amendment held not 'law' under Article 13(2)
1964
Sajjan Singh
Supreme Court reaffirmed the Shankari Prasad position
1967
Golak Nath
Supreme Court reversed Shankari Prasad and Sajjan Singh

Shankari Prasad v. Union of India (1951) was the first case in which the Supreme Court decided whether Parliament could amend Fundamental Rights using its constitutional amending power, and whether such an amendment could be struck down under Article 13. Decided barely a year after the Constitution commenced, it set the initial ground rules for the long-running contest between Parliament's amending power and the judiciary's power of review — rules that would later be overturned, revived, and refined across several more landmark cases.

Background: The First Amendment and the Right to Property

The case arose out of a challenge to the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, which had curtailed the right to property. The First Amendment restricted the scope of the freedoms guaranteed under Article 19, made adjustments to Article 13 concerning existing laws, and inserted Article 31A to shield land reform legislation from being challenged on Fundamental Rights grounds. Petitioners argued that since Article 13(2) barred the State from making any law that takes away or abridges a Fundamental Right, and any such law would be void, the First Amendment — which abridged the right to property — should itself be void.

The outcome hinged entirely on how the Court read the word 'law' in Article 13(2), and whether a constitutional amendment enacted under Article 368 fell within that word.

The Court's Reasoning

The Supreme Court held that Parliament's power to amend the Constitution under Article 368 is a constituent power — a power to reshape the Constitution's own text — and is fundamentally different in character from Parliament's ordinary legislative power to make laws under its normal law-making competence. Article 13(2), the Court reasoned, was directed at the exercise of ordinary legislative power, not at the exercise of constituent power.

On this reasoning, the word 'law' in Article 13 covers only ordinary laws — Acts of a Legislature, ordinances, rules, regulations, and the like — and does not extend to a constitutional amendment act, which is a piece of constituent law-making rather than ordinary legislation. Consequently, the Court upheld the First Amendment: Parliament could amend, abridge, or even take away a Fundamental Right through a constitutional amendment, and such an amendment would not be void under Article 13.

What the Ruling Established

The Shankari Prasad judgment did two things that shaped constitutional law for the next two decades:

  • It separated legislative power from constituent power, treating them as conceptually distinct exercises of authority even though both are performed by the same Parliament.
  • It placed constitutional amendments outside the reach of Article 13, meaning Fundamental Rights could, in principle, be curtailed by amendment without judicial interference on Article 13 grounds.

This position was not an isolated holding. The Supreme Court reaffirmed it in the Sajjan Singh case (1964), when the Seventeenth Amendment — which had inserted certain state land laws into the Ninth Schedule — was again challenged on similar grounds. The Court once more held that a constitutional amendment act made under Article 368 is not 'law' within the meaning of Article 13.

The Position Did Not Last

The Shankari Prasad-Sajjan Singh line of reasoning held the field for sixteen years, until the Supreme Court reversed itself in the Golak Nath case (1967). A larger bench in that case held that Fundamental Rights occupy a 'transcendental and immutable' position and that a constitutional amendment act is, after all, 'law' under Article 13 — meaning it too could be declared void if it violated Part III. The Golak Nath ruling was itself given only prospective effect, so as not to unsettle amendments already made under the Shankari Prasad position.

Parliament's response to Golak Nath — the 24th Amendment Act (1971) — and the Supreme Court's eventual answer in the Kesavananda Bharati case (1973), which introduced the basic structure doctrine, form the next chapters of this same debate and are covered in the related articles below.

Why Shankari Prasad Still Matters

Even though its specific holding on Article 13 was eventually overtaken by later developments, Shankari Prasad remains significant for UPSC purposes for three reasons: it is the first Supreme Court pronouncement on the amendability of Fundamental Rights; it introduced the enduring distinction between constituent power and legislative power; and it is the fixed starting point of the chronology that every question on the basic structure doctrine ultimately traces back to.

UPSC Relevance

Prelims: Shankari Prasad (1951) is frequently paired with Sajjan Singh (1964) and Golak Nath (1967) in chronology-based or match-the-following questions on the evolution of the basic structure doctrine. Remember which side of the 'amendment is/is not law under Article 13' line each case falls on.

Mains: Useful as the opening reference point in answers on the evolution of the relationship between Parliament's amending power and judicial review, or on how the meaning of 'constituent power' developed in Indian constitutional law.

FAQ

What did Shankari Prasad v. Union of India (1951) decide? That Parliament's power to amend the Constitution under Article 368, being a constituent power, is different from its ordinary legislative power, so a constitutional amendment act is not 'law' under Article 13 and cannot be struck down on that ground.

Which amendment was under challenge? The First Amendment Act, 1951, which had curtailed the right to property, among other changes.

Was this position permanent? No. It was reaffirmed in Sajjan Singh (1964) but reversed in Golak Nath (1967), and the question was ultimately settled differently through the 24th Amendment and the Kesavananda Bharati case (1973).

What is the difference between constituent power and legislative power that the Court relied on? Constituent power is Parliament's power to amend the Constitution's own text under Article 368; legislative power is its ordinary power to enact laws under its normal law-making competence. The Court treated Article 13(2) as applying only to the latter.

Why is Shankari Prasad still taught if it was effectively overtaken? Because it is the first and foundational case in the sequence of judgments that eventually produced the basic structure doctrine, and it remains a standard reference point for that chronology.

Quick Revision

  • Shankari Prasad v. Union of India (1951): first case on whether amendments are 'law' under Article 13.
  • Challenge concerned the First Amendment Act, 1951, which curtailed the right to property.
  • Court held constituent power (Article 368) is distinct from legislative power; amendments are not 'law' under Article 13(2).
  • Reaffirmed in Sajjan Singh (1964); overruled in Golak Nath (1967).
  • Chronology to remember: Shankari Prasad (1951) → Sajjan Singh (1964) → Golak Nath (1967) → 24th Amendment (1971) → Kesavananda Bharati (1973).

Sources

  • The Constitution of India, Article 13 and Article 368 — legislative.gov.in
  • Shankari Prasad v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 458 — Supreme Court of India

Further Reference

For deeper reading on this topic and the wider polity syllabus, these standard works are recommended:

  • M. Laxmikanth, Indian Polity (McGraw Hill) — the standard UPSC handbook.
  • D.D. Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India (LexisNexis) — authoritative constitutional-law treatment.
  • The Constitution of India — Bare Act — the official text.

Constitutional provisions

Article 13

Voids laws inconsistent with Fundamental Rights; Shankari Prasad held this does not cover constitutional amendments.

Article 368

Source of Parliament's constituent power to amend the Constitution, held distinct from ordinary legislative power.

Relevant Acts & Judgments

Acts
First Amendment Act, 1951
Curtailed the right to property and added Article 31A; upheld in Shankari Prasad.
Judgments
Shankari Prasad v. Union of India (1951)
Constitutional amendments are not 'law' under Article 13(2); constituent power distinct from legislative power.
Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1964)
Reaffirmed the Shankari Prasad position.
Golak Nath v. State of Punjab (1967)
Overruled Shankari Prasad and Sajjan Singh.
Key distinction: Don't confuse Shankari Prasad's holding (amendment is not 'law' under Article 13) with the later Golak Nath position (amendment IS 'law' under Article 13) — the two are direct opposites, separated by 16 years.
shankari-prasad-casearticle-13constituent-powerfirst-amendmentfundamental-rightsarticle-368
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Shankari Prasad Case (1951): Amendments and Article 13 | UPSC.wiki