National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC)

NCRWC review constitution is shorthand for the exercise carried out by the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, a body the Government of India set up in 2000 to examine, after fifty years of constitutional experience, whether India's institutions of governance were still serving the country well. Headed by a former Chief Justice of India, the Commission spent two years studying the political, administrative, and legal system before submitting a report packed with recommendations — most of which were never enacted, but many of which continue to shape reform debates in Parliament and the courts.

Background and Establishment

The Commission was constituted through a resolution of the Government of India in 2000, popularly known by its acronym NCRWC. It was an eleven-member body chaired by M.N. Venkatachaliah, a former Chief Justice of India. Its other members included the then Chairman of the Law Commission, a former Supreme Court judge, a former Attorney-General, a former Secretary-General of the Lok Sabha, a former Ambassador, a former Member of Parliament, and a former Speaker of the Lok Sabha, giving the panel a mix of judicial, legislative, and administrative experience. The Commission submitted its report to the Government in 2002.

Terms of Reference

The Commission's terms of reference asked it to examine, in light of fifty years of constitutional experience, how far the existing provisions of the Constitution could support an efficient, smooth, and effective system of governance and socio-economic development, and to recommend changes accordingly. Crucially, the terms of reference restricted the Commission to working within the framework of parliamentary democracy and barred it from touching the "basic structure" or "basic features" of the Constitution.

The Commission itself clarified that its mandate was to review the working of the Constitution, not to rewrite it, and that its role was purely recommendatory and advisory — Parliament remained free to accept or reject any suggestion. No fixed agenda was handed to it; instead, the Commission identified eleven broad areas for study on its own, spanning the working of the legislature, executive, and judiciary, electoral reform, Centre-State relations, decentralisation through Panchayati Raj, Fundamental Rights and Duties, the Directive Principles, and standards in public administration.

What the Commission Found

The Commission's diagnosis of the political system was blunt. It flagged a breakdown of public faith in government, rising criminalisation of politics, an alarming fiscal deficit, weak mechanisms for disaster response and national security, and instability caused by defections and coalition politics. It also pointed to gaps in the criminal justice system, communal tension, and lagging indicators in health, education, and child welfare as areas needing urgent constitutional and legislative attention.

Recommendations

In all, the Commission made 249 recommendations. Of these, 58 required constitutional amendments, 86 called for new legislation, and the remaining 105 could be implemented through executive action alone — meaning the bulk of its suggestions did not need Parliament to touch the Constitution at all.

Some of the more significant area-wise recommendations were:

• Fundamental Rights — widening the anti-discrimination guarantee under Articles 15 and 16, and adding new rights such as protection against torture, compensation for illegal deprivation of life or liberty, the right to privacy, and a right to rural wage employment for a minimum of eighty days a year.
• Preventive detention (Article 22) — capping the maximum period of preventive detention at six months and requiring the advisory board to include serving High Court judges.
• Right to Property (Article 300-A) — recasting the provision so that deprivation of property must be for a public purpose, must not be arbitrary, and must include a rehabilitation scheme when land belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes is acquired.
• Parliament and legislatures — fixing minimum annual sitting days (120 for the Lok Sabha, 100 for the Rajya Sabha, and 50–90 for State Assemblies depending on strength) and clarifying that parliamentary privilege does not shield corrupt acts.
• Executive and administration — capping the Council of Ministers at 10 per cent of a House's strength, introducing a "constructive vote of no-confidence," and creating a constitutional Lokpal and state Lokayuktas.
• Centre-State relations — restricting the use of Article 356 (President's Rule) to a last resort and requiring the President to consult the Chief Minister before appointing a Governor.
• Judiciary — setting up a National Judicial Commission, headed by the Chief Justice of India along with two senior Supreme Court judges, the Union Law Minister, and a presidential nominee, to recommend judicial appointments, and raising the retirement age of judges.
• Decentralisation — declaring Panchayats and Municipalities to be genuine "institutions of self-government" with a separate fiscal domain, and restructuring the Eleventh and Twelfth Schedules.
• Electoral reforms — disqualifying candidates facing charges carrying a sentence of five years or more, and routing appointments of the Chief Election Commissioner through a broader consultative body.
• Anti-defection law (Tenth Schedule) — requiring defectors to resign and recontest, barring them from ministerial office for the remainder of the term, and shifting the power to decide disqualification from the Speaker to the Election Commission.

Controversy and the Basic Structure

The Commission's work was not free of political friction. Several opposition parties and civil society organisations boycotted its proceedings, apprehensive that a wholesale constitutional review could dilute the document's core commitments. The Commission was itself divided on at least one issue — the eligibility of persons of non-Indian origin to hold high constitutional offices — a disagreement significant enough that one member, a former Lok Sabha Speaker, quit the Commission a few months before the report was finalised.

Despite the controversy, the Commission stayed within its mandate: it neither questioned nor proposed any change that would have disturbed the basic structure doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in the Kesavananda Bharati case. This restraint is often cited as evidence of how deeply the basic structure doctrine had, by 2002, become embedded in India's constitutional practice — even a wide-ranging review commission chose to work around it rather than challenge it.

Outcome and Legacy

Because the Commission's brief was advisory, none of its 249 recommendations became binding, and few were enacted as a package. Even so, the report has served as reference material for later reform bodies — the Punchhi Commission on Centre-State relations (2010) drew on the NCRWC's findings alongside the earlier Sarkaria Commission, and its suggestions on anti-defection and electoral disqualification still surface in later Election Commission and Law Commission reports.

UPSC Relevance

Prelims

• Year of constitution (2000) and submission of report (2002); chairman M.N. Venkatachaliah.
• Break-up of 249 recommendations: 58 constitutional, 86 legislative, 105 executive.
• Constraint given to the Commission: work within parliamentary democracy without touching the basic structure.

Mains

• GS2: Constitutional bodies and review commissions — comparing the NCRWC with the Sarkaria and Punchhi Commissions on Centre-State relations.
• GS2: Debate on codifying anti-defection reforms and judicial appointment mechanisms recommended by the Commission.
• Essay/GS2: Whether a periodic review of a working constitution strengthens or risks its stability, using the NCRWC's basic-structure restraint as an example.

FAQ

What is the NCRWC? The National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution was a government-appointed panel, set up in 2000 under M.N. Venkatachaliah, tasked with examining whether India's constitutional provisions still served the country's governance needs after fifty years.

Did the NCRWC amend the Constitution? No. It had no power to amend anything; it could only recommend, and Parliament remained free to accept, modify, or ignore any suggestion.

Why was the NCRWC controversial? Some opposition parties and organisations boycotted it, fearing a full review could weaken constitutional guarantees. The Commission itself split on the question of eligibility of non-Indian-origin citizens for high office, prompting one member's resignation.

Did the NCRWC touch the basic structure of the Constitution? No. Its terms of reference expressly barred it from proposing changes to the basic structure, and the Commission adhered to this limit throughout its recommendations.

How is the NCRWC different from the Sarkaria Commission? The Sarkaria Commission (1983) focused specifically on Centre-State relations, while the NCRWC (2000) reviewed the Constitution's working across all major institutions — legislature, executive, judiciary, Fundamental Rights, and Centre-State relations alike.

Quick Revision

• NCRWC set up: 2000, by Government of India resolution.
• Chairman: M.N. Venkatachaliah, former Chief Justice of India.
• Report submitted: 2002.
• Total recommendations: 249 (58 constitutional, 86 legislative, 105 executive).
• Nature of the Commission: recommendatory and advisory only.
• Restriction: could not propose changes to the basic structure of the Constitution.
• Key recommendation areas: Fundamental Rights, Right to Property, Parliament, Executive, Centre-State relations, Judiciary, Panchayati Raj, electoral reform, anti-defection law.

Sources

• Constitution of India, Articles 22, 300-A, 356, 368 — legislative.gov.in
• Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) — basic structure doctrine, Supreme Court of India
• Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India — Report of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (2002)

Further Reference

For deeper reading on this topic and the wider polity syllabus, these standard works are recommended:

• M. Laxmikanth, Indian Polity (McGraw Hill) — the standard UPSC handbook.
• D.D. Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India (LexisNexis) — authoritative constitutional-law treatment.
• The Constitution of India — Bare Act — the official text.

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